25

THE COURT: Do we have folks on the telephone as

THE CLERK: Yes, sir.

well?

THE COURT: And they're there?

THE CLERK: They're there.

THE COURT: Very good. Okay. Folks, we have something which I've never done, try to handle ten appeals at the same time, right? That's a challenge for all of us, I'm sure, counsel as well as the Court. And I presume everyone saw my order of yesterday in which I was trying to create some sanity to this process and rationality.

And, folks, for those -- I want to hear from everybody who has something important to say, but there's obviously an element of repetition here after awhile, on -- there's, you know, obviously some distinct issues in certain states, which I expect those state counsel to address. But we need not relitigate over and over again, the same issues. If you have something you need to point out that maybe somebody else didn't, I want to hear that. This argument is not an empty exercise; I'm trying to make sure I've considered everything.

For those of you who have not had the opportunity to previously appear before me, let me start with some premises. I read everything. I have read every Magistrate Judge order, I have read every brief, and I'm embarrassed to say I've read every case, okay? So somebody giving me a factual background

or a legal standard, it's not that helpful. I kind of know where we are.

Mr. Cheffo, are you going to argue on behalf of the appellant here?

MR. CHEFFO: I am, Your Honor.

1

2

7

8

10

12

13

14

15

16

19

20

21

23

24

25

10:06:20AM 3

10:06:29AM 5

10:06:31AM 6

10:06:39AM 9

10:06:44AM11

10:07:03AM17

10:07:04AM18

10:07:15AM22

THE COURT: Very good. And we're going to begin with the California cases. Do you wish to reserve anything in reply?

MR. CHEFFO: I do, Your Honor, thank you. Thanks for the order. It was actually very helpful to get that guidance.

I would like to reserve three minutes. I would just say this, too, Your Honor, I'll be guided however you want to proceed. I took to heart a lot of what you said, and as you can see, frankly, if there are four or five arguments that would apply to California, frankly, those — four of them, if you will, will apply to Illinois and Missouri.

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. CHEFFO: So I, again, with your indulgence, I don't think I need a lot more time. If I had an extra five minutes, I could probably cover those, and then basically when we get to Illinois, say see what I told you a little earlier.

THE COURT: That would be helpful. I just want to -Illinois counsel may have a particular twist on something, and
I want to give you both a chance to address those and to reply
to that, if you feel like you need to. But you've appeared in

front of me enough to know that there's certain things that are kind of a waste of time and some things that are useful in terms of oral argument.

So let's start with -- we're going to reserve three minutes. And why don't you come to the podium, if you might.

MR. CHEFFO: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And I'll be glad to hear from you on the California remand issues.

MR. CHEFFO: Thank you, Your Honor. And I also did -- I thought this one lent itself -- hopefully you'll find it helpful, some Power Points. We don't use them every time, but maybe this is as helpful for me as it is for you.

THE COURT: Well, it always sends my staff into uncontrollable laughter when anyone tries to do a Power Point with me, but I'm glad to hear you out on that.

MR. CHEFFO: I think I've tried to helpfully get to the point here, and we'll leave obviously copies for counsel and for Your Honor.

So the four issues, and again, really at any time obviously this is for Your Honor, so you tell me, as you will, I know, if things — First going to talk about the Magistrate Judge's ruling, just to determine, as you know, he determined that there's essentially no jurisdiction to hear that, so I was going to talk a little bit about that, and then move specifically into the reasons, assuming that you agree or

10:07:37AM 4

10:07:45AM 6

10:07:47AM 7

8

1

2

3

5

10:07:51AM 9

10

11

12

10:08:03AM13

14

15

10:08:13AM16

17

18

10:08:18AM19

20

22

21

23

24

you're going to entertain that, to hear CAFA, why we think there is CAFA jurisdiction. Frankly, beyond that, as Your Honor probably knows, we wouldn't need to probably get to fraudulent joinder and misjoinder and severance, if you determine CAFA, at least as to the California cases, but I'm prepared to at least --

THE COURT: I think you ought to be prepared to argue all of those, because they do -- the last two obviously have something to do with other states.

MR. CHEFFO: They do.

THE COURT: And they're important issues. Let me start with you, just to disrupt your planned presentation here.

MR. CHEFFO: That's okay.

THE COURT: That we start with this -- let's just assume for purposes of this argument that with the Ninth Circuit cases, this would be a mass action, okay? Just the sort of unique aspects of Ninth Circuit law interplaying with the California law about saying for all purposes. Let's just assume for purposes of that, we've got a mass action.

Here's where it's confusing to me. The JPML has taken the position it won't look at the reasonableness of removal, that that's something for the transferring court. It said that in the Darvocet case, it said it in my very case, there were 91 California plaintiffs who asserted this and were told, go to

10:08:57AM 7

0

8

1

2

3

4

5

6

10:09:03AM10

10:09:04AM11

.0.05.01711111

12

13

10:09:10AM14

10:09:11AM15

16

17 18

19

20

10:09:36AM21

22

23

1.3

10:10:18AM 6

10:10:37AM11

South Carolina. I understand the defendant argument to be I can't look at it. And it strikes me, Mr. Cheffo, that just can't be the law that you can — that a defendant can remove a case, and no court can review that. That just can not be the law.

And I agree with you, and I think y'all kind of straightened out my Magistrate Judge, that he couldn't -- we could not remand cases directly to the District Court of California; that is a unique prerogative of the JPML. But there can be a recommendation of that from my court.

And so I have trouble understanding how, number one, I can't look at it, which doesn't make sense to me. And then, you know, when we get down to looking squarely at the issue, I've dug a little bit into the legislative history of CAFA, and there was obviously this huge debate going on about class actions that were sticking in the state courts because of the very issue y'all are raising about fraudulent joinder. Okay? I mean, they weren't winning because the case law is so terrible. And defendants like your clients were urging the Court to — the Congress, because they weren't winning in the courts, to provide some federal jurisdiction. And Congress looks like to me it reached a compromise, as Congress, when it works, does. And agreed, A, we're going to let, with minimal diversity, not complete diversity, we're going to allow federal jurisdiction, but we are not going to let 407

transfers, we're not going to have MDL transfers. That's what I sort of understood to be the deal. Unless, unless, the plaintiffs consented.

So yes, I mean, the way I read -- and I got into the legislative history a little bit -- was yes, we're going to allow federal jurisdiction in the districts where these cases were removed, but the plaintiffs are going to have to consent to join an MDL.

What I see your argument is that I should basically, for one reason or another, ignore what seems to me a central part of the deal under CAFA, and force the plaintiffs who do not wish to be here, to join this MDL. And I understand the policy argument that it would be, in a perfect world, it would be wonderful to have everybody here at the party, right? I mean, that's a rational orderly way of doing things. But it just appears that's not what the law is. And if I were in Congress, I might vote differently.

But tell me, as a judge, how, when I'm trying to apply the rule of law in a neutral way, how I'm able to overcome these problems, and force this group of plaintiffs who don't want to be here, under CAFA, how I can make them be here.

MR. CHEFFO: Let me see if I can answer. I understand those points and I think they're fair points, or they're fair questions, mainly because you asked them.

THE COURT: Kind of important. You know, I try not

10:12:27AM 9

10:12:02AM 4

11 12

> 14 15

1.3

1

2

3

5

6

7

8

10

16

17

10:13:09AM18

20

19

21

10:13:26AM22

23

24

10:13:36AM25

to hide the ball here, I kind of want to let people know where my concerns are. And if I were your client, I would have sympathy for your view. I can understand the plaintiffs' view as well.

MR. CHEFFO: Actually I think I have answers to both of them.

THE COURT: Good, I want to hear that.

MR. CHEFFO: Let's see if I can skip ahead, you'll get a preview.

THE COURT: I always make you do this on your Power Point, you have to go skipping around.

MR. CHEFFO: Pretty much. Good thing I looked at these before today.

So the first issue really is kind of like what the -Where is the Darvocet cases? Is that earlier on? So
here's -- I think as the --

THE COURT: We're talking about the Darvocet JPML cases?

MR. CHEFFO: Correct. And really yours. This is the issue. So as I hear Your Honor saying, look, you know, how is it that these cases, you know, can be transferred, and what's the remedy, right, is there a remedy for appeal, and I think there is a remedy. So the Darvocet JPML and the JPML in connection with these cases essentially said we understand plaintiffs' position on CAFA, that you can't transfer these

6

10:13:51AM 5

10:13:54AM 7

10:13:55AM 8

J

1

2

3

10:13:58AM10

11

10:14:03AM12

13

10:14:06AM14

15

16

10:14:20AM17

18

10:14:24AM19

20

22

21

23

24

10:15:32AM15

10:15:01AM 4

10:15:07AM 7

based on the CAFA rules; however, we are reading that consistent with the MDL rules, that if there are other bases for --

THE COURT: First of all, let me say I agree with that, but then you have to win the fraudulent joinder issue to get there.

MR. CHEFFO: Again, that's -- I'll address that, too, Your Honor, but here's the issue. Let me get first, if I could, what's the way to address this? There is a way. If any case -- forget about CAFA -- if a case is transferred improperly or somebody believes it's been transferred improperly, there is a provision, to take an extraordinary writ to the Fourth Circuit in this case. That's what people can do if they think that the case is improperly transferred.

THE COURT: That is not what the JPML thinks is going to happen, and how they interpret the rule as a practical matter, requiring some extraordinary — I mean, there's always in every case the ability to go to a court in an extraordinary writ, regardless what the rules are. We've had that come up in a variety of areas. But there is — listen, it is very clear that my colleagues on that panel, A, do not feel they have the authority or really the capacity, with their limited staff, to get into these cases, and they expect a transferring court to deal with it. I'm just going to tell you that. I'm just telling you, that's reality.

10:16:13AM 1

10:16:14AM 2

4 5

3

6

7

8

10:16:37AM 9

10:16:39AM10

10:16:41AM11

10:16:43AM12

13 14

10:16:53AM15

16

17

18

10:17:10AM19

20

21

22 23

24

25

MR. CHEFFO: Sure.

THE COURT: And so I'm going to review it. sorry, Mr. Cheffo, I'm going to look at it. But then I've got to look at this, you know, this provision that says I -- first of all, I'm going to assume -- I'm asking a question I know the answer, but let's just put it on the record -- the plaintiffs do not consent to be here, the majority; am I correct?

MR. CHEFFO: I think that's fair.

THE COURT: Okay. So I see a nod.

MR. CHEFFO: Any of them, I think. I think --

THE COURT: So I mean, I think there's a procedure better than the one that always exists, which is you can seek an extraordinary writ.

I don't believe that the -- that there was an intention to create a situation where no court responsible for the case could review your action in removal. That just can not be the law.

MR. CHEFFO: And that's not really our position. there's a few things. One is the idea was you remove it, you have multiple causes of action. Certainly you have the good faith provisions and when the cases are removed if there's something obviously egregious. Then the cases get tagged and they go to the JPML. Now, JPML's job is not to look at the merits, we all agree with that, but they've determined, based

2

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

13

15

16

21

23

24

25

10:18:11AM12

10:18:13AM14

10:18:19AM17

10:18:20AM18

10:18:22AM19

10:18:24AM20

10:18:29AM22

10:17:35AM 3

on 1407, that they're going to transfer them to you, just like they would any remand motion.

THE COURT: There's like no filter there. I'm telling you, there is no -- Let me say this. There is both the law, there is the interpretation, and there's a certain knowledge that those of us who are handling these major cases have acquired, okay? And there's a famous Fourth Circuit case that says, "You seek to persuade us as judges what we know to be untrue as men." Okay? I mean, there just can't be the law that you could just sort of bring them all there, there's no filter there, it's just a mechanical process.

MR. CHEFFO: On that one I would disagree, Your Honor.

THE COURT: They do not. They don't have the -their staff -- I don't know if you know about their staff,
it's very limited staff.

MR. CHEFFO: It is.

THE COURT: I have one person assigned to this case.

MR. CHEFFO: And they do a fantastic job --

THE COURT: I don't criticize them, I'm just telling you there's one staff member assigned to the Lipitor case.

MR. CHEFFO: But there is a process, right? So there's things, once you get tagged, and I know Your Honor knows this, but sometimes there's also a provision to file objections, and they get briefed. And these issues were

briefed. So --

1

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

12

1.3

14

16

17

18

19

21

23

24

25

10:19:14AM11

10:19:24AM15

10:19:39AM20

10:19:49AM22

10:18:38AM 2

THE COURT: And they said, under Darvocet, we don't review this. They're expecting me to do it. I'm going to do the job that the transferring court has responsibility to do, which is to take a look at this, and to say, hold it a minute, CAFA jurisdiction -- Now, you know, if it's CAFA plus something else, and there's otherwise jurisdiction, diversity, for instance, as you assert, no problem. No problem. Okay? That's not an issue. But if there's no other jurisdiction but CAFA, you can't make the plaintiffs be here.

MR. CHEFFO: So there's two issues, right? Let's see what Judge Reeves did in Darvocet. Judge Reeves basically had the cases transferred -- I was involved in that litigation, too, and he --

THE COURT: There's a famous story that Thurgood Marshall, arguing at that very podium, was arguing a major civil rights case, and somebody said, what about this case? And he said, I handled that case. What about this case? I handled that case. And every case, he handled the case.

MR. CHEFFO: Let's be clear, this is not Thurgood

Marshal arguing remand issues, just so we're very clear today.

But so with respect to Darvocet, what Judge Reeves did was he basically said, you know, I think he shared a similar view. But what he did do was he decided CAFA. Right? And then what he said -- so he first -- he took the case, he decided it.

Because look, there's --

10:20:05AM 2

10:20:09AM 4

10:20:26AM11

10:20:43AM16

10:20:45AM17

10:21:02AM22

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

12

13

14

15

18

19

20

21

23

24

25

THE COURT: When you say decided CAFA, what do you mean by that?

MR. CHEFFO: He said there is CAFA jurisdiction. He decided the ultimate issue. So I just want to make sure we're clear on this. To me, there's like three or four different set issues. One is, you know, can this essentially be an appeal or correction of the issues before you? The second issue is, once you have them, can you ultimately look at them? You know, we think the magistrate judge --

THE COURT: You've got one issue is, does this appear to be a mass action? I think you're right. I think under the fourth -- the Ninth Circuit cases, I think it's -- I might not have logically reached that conclusion, but I understand how they did it, makes sense to me, I'm going to apply their law.

MR. CHEFFO: That's what Judge Reeves did.

THE COURT: But then I've got to say this has been transferred, so I'm assuming the Federal District Court in California -- now, there is one issue I haven't addressed, timeliness. Okay? The question is, who should do that, we'll talk about that in a second.

But yes, I think there is likely CAFA jurisdiction in the Federal District Courts of California. Okay? But the next question is, is it subject to removal, with that the only basis of jurisdiction, to the In Re: Lipitor MDL in the

District of South Carolina? That is the problem.

MR. CHEFFO: There's two remedies. So if we get -potential remedies, right? Three. One is you've now, let's
assume you decide there is CAFA jurisdiction here, you then
can say I'm going to -- these cases, essentially the venue
transfer provisions are really a one-way street, and there was
colorable claims -- and of course I'm not, you know, throwing
away the other claims, because you may also agree with us on
some of these others.

THE COURT: We're going to get to that.

MR. CHEFFO: Assume for argument sake you said I've looked at everything, I find CAFA, I don't find anything else, right?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. CHEFFO: You then can say, well, because there was a good faith, these are not frivolous arguments, I'm going to keep the case. That's one.

The other thing you could do is you could certify the question to the Fourth Circuit. Not appeal, I'm not suggesting appeal, but you could say, hey, I now have this case --

THE COURT: I don't feel the need to do that.

MR. CHEFFO: And you may not. Or what you could do is you could then do a suggestion of remand to the MDL panel. Right? And you could do that. And then probably what would

10:21:48AM10

10:21:25AM 2

10:21:50AM11

12

1

3

4

5

6

7

8

13

10:21:55AM14

10:21:55AM15

16

17

10:22:01AM18

19

20

21

10:22:12AM22

10:22:14AM23

24

happen at that point is that this issue may get briefed with that, and they may not, they may --

THE COURT: They avoided it in the Darvocet case.

MR. CHEFFO: They did, but what happened ultimately in Darvocet, once it got back to California, you know what the judges did?

THE COURT: No.

MR. CHEFFO: 1404'ed it back to the MDL.

THE COURT: And that may be what they do here. And you know, one of the things you have — counsel has asked, lead counsel has asked me not to close down the MDL after these orders. And I am, you know, inclined not to do that. For one reason, the Fourth Circuit might not agree with me, and second reason is there could be issues like this that they could come back.

The question is, what's the right court to do -- I mean, let me just say this, Mr. Cheffo. I don't want to blow past this timeliness issue. It's not a small issue. And I've looked at it. I think it's better for the District Courts in California who have, you know, they know that -- they apply that California state law regarding the consolidation of cases, Ninth Circuit's their circuit, I think they're the better court, frankly, to look at this issue. But it's not a small issue, Mr. Cheffo. I'm going to tell you, it's not a small issue. And I think I'm probably doing you a favor not

10:22:37AM 7

10:22:29AM 3

10:22:32AM 4

10:22:37AM 8

10:22:39AM 9

10

11 12

1

2

5

6

13

14

15

10:23:03AM16

17

20

18

19

21

22

2.4

2

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

10:23:48AM 3

to rule on it, frankly. If you pressed me, I might, but I think you're probably better served let the district judges.

My general practice -- I want to talk to you about this. Is like these fraudulent joinders, there's some issues that have been raised in this MDL no District Judge in America has ever seen. I mean, they're just unique, interesting issues. Fraudulent joinder is like something we get like seven times a day. Okay? I mean, we have these counties in South Carolina where the plaintiffs love to try cases, and they're always looking for the conductor or, you know, the pharmacist or whoever it would be, the random state party of the defendant to defeat diversity. And we get these cases constantly. And our practice here is that we remand them. And many times my defendants go back there and immediately do discovery. I mean, they don't mess around, when that thing is -- there's a challenged remand, they take it right back, because they have that one year, they get back there, they do discovery, they get summary judgment against the defendant who, as they asserted, there's no real claim, and they come back. that all the time. Y'all elected not to do that. You had your own strategic reasons, I don't question it. Some defendants don't do that, I mean, I don't question the strategy. But that was an option your client had to do. But I don't keep those cases. I don't sit there and dig into whether there's -- I mean, my circuit, you know, glimmer of

hope, whoever heard of such a legal standard, right? Who could invent a glimmer of hope standard. I don't think there's any other area of the law that has a lower legal bar or standard than fraudulent joinder. I mean, it is --

MR. CHEFFO: I agree.

THE COURT: It is the lowest standard that I have ever encountered in any area of the law.

And you can -- I mean, I have the occasion to deal with capital cases which, you know, people's lives are in jeopardy. Higher standard, okay? I mean, this is like the lowest standard known. And it's not a new issue, Mr. Cheffo. This has been a century of this stuff, right? This is 1913 is the original case.

MR. CHEFFO: There's no question. And everything you said, I frankly agree with. I think there are a few different issues here, right, there are issues here of fraudulent joinder, but there's also issues here of procedural misjoinder, which is not quite as clear.

THE COURT: Let me say this, and to make it easy for you, I think y'all's various variations of the fraudulent joinder theory are interesting, and in the right case are credible. I found them pretty interesting. But they're all going to have the glimmer of hope, no possibility standard. Because they're joinder issues.

MR. CHEFFO: No, well --

10:25:38AM 5

10:25:39AM 6

10:25:43AM 8

0 1 2 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0

10

7

1

2

3

11

12

13

10:26:10AM14

15

16

17

18

10:26:23AM19

21

20

22

23

24

10:26:44AM25

10:26:45AM 1 I believe that's the standard. 10:26:48AM 2 MR. CHEFFO: I would say -- I'm sorry to interrupt, 3 Your Honor, but the only thing I would say is we've actually 4 approached this from two ways. So we approached it the --5 it's not egregiousness, but I would give you the standard is 6 high. But here's what most courts, there's a Benicar court 7 just did this in New Jersey. The Court basically looked at this and said, you know, probably similar to much of what 8 you're saying, this is kind of complicated, there's a lot of 9 10 different ways of dealing with this; however, I don't need to get there, I can basically decide this by just good old Rule 11 12 21 severance. Right? I'm going to look at these cases. And 1.3 frankly, when you do that, you basically -- all of the issues 14 that we've been talking about. So here, so the Benicar case, 15 and there are others, said I have CMOs in place that 16 essentially disaggregate this. Well, we do, too, we have 17 short form complaints. No one has ever suggested that, you 18 know, you could even file a multi-person complaint. You have 19 been, you know, kind of in this litigation, you know what the 20 claims are, what the differences are, right? So from a 21 joinder perspective in severance, look at -- these are just a 22 few of them, different pharmacies, different purposes,

different doses, conversations --

23

25

10:27:56AM24

THE COURT: My Magistrate Judge pointed out, same drug, same research, same marketing. I mean --

10:28:04AM 1

10:28:05AM 2

10:28:22AM 7

10:29:01AM20

10:29:13AM24

MR. CHEFFO: But those are not severance.

THE COURT: I mean, I think these very -- I call them the variations of the fraudulent joinder theory which you apply to defense claims, you apply to plaintiffs, are interesting ideas. I don't think they are particularly persuasive in this particular set of facts.

MR. CHEFFO: Your Honor, I mean here's where -- I would just urge you to think differently about fraudulent joinder of plaintiffs and defendants, and procedural misjoinder. They make my kind of head spin, but those are different contexts, there's some law on them, and they talk about very high standards, and there is -- some courts have adopted them, many courts have not. But when you look at the basic severance, there is a huge number of cases that I think sometimes people try and make this too hard. Right? They basically, look, this is the Benicar case, the issue of complete diversity is mooted by virtue of the management order requiring severance of the plaintiffs. So when they got there they had to be severed.

There's actually this Propecia case, "If plaintiffs can escape the MDL by joining multiple, unconnected and nondiverse parties in a State Court of their choice, they defeat the purposes of the MDL and deny defendants their rights."

Most of -- this is Propecia is a hair loss -- most of these, if you look at these, these are all medical device

pharmaceutical cases, same exact issues, they go on and on.

1

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1.3

14

15

16

18

21

22

23

10:30:20AM17

10:30:23AM19

10:30:23AM20

10:30:42AM24

10:30:45AM25

10:29:22AM 2

THE COURT: Let me tell you something. I know y'all disagree with the State Courts that -- I mean, in Missouri, for instance, you know, there is these -- my colleagues in Missouri are all over the place about -- and there's no appellate court case in Missouri. But there's at least an Eighth Circuit case that hasn't been reversed and still followed as recently as this year, in which it says, you know, that these -- that the defendant has consented to personal jurisdiction in the -- to jurisdiction in the state by registering -- and I mean, I -- listen, I know that argument, okay? That's not the law in South Carolina, but I'm saying -- I'm looking at is there no possibility that they're going to be successful there? I would say, depending on the judge they get, they may have 100 percent chance of winning; depends who the judge is.

MR. CHEFFO: So I look at this -- Can I step over here, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Absolutely.

MR. CHEFFO: A few things. So we have CAFA, right?

First. Then we basically -- let me look at my note here -- we have -- before we even get into fraudulent joinder or misjoinder -- Can you see that?

THE COURT: I can.

MR. CHEFFO: We basically have this idea of

severance, right, so you don't even need to get into these first.

THE COURT: Why would I sever it?

1

2

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

15

16

19

21

22

23

24

25

10:31:25AM14

10:31:31AM17

10:31:31AM18

10:31:36AM20

10:30:52AM 3

10:30:54AM 4

MR. CHEFFO: Because if you looked at severance, you would have a number of cases that would have just straight — and this applies, frankly, in the Missouri cases as well — it's what — and this is what the Federal Courts do. And I think this is like setting the table. It's not a substantive merits issue. So you'd say wait a minute, let's say someone came into Federal Court and they filed a 97-person complaint from all over the place. Right? If the clerk would even accept that, without doing it, you know, most — in this case, forget the other one —

THE COURT: These are not direct file cases, these are coming out of a State Court in which the clerk in the State Court allowed it.

MR. CHEFFO: I understand.

THE COURT: And the court in that state permitted it.

I agree with you, we wouldn't allow it.

MR. CHEFFO: Okay. But here's what the point is. We are investigating, you are investigating determining whether my client, right, has Federal Court jurisdiction, a very important, you know, issue for us and for you and for the courts. And when you set the table to make these decisions, you have to use the tools that you have. Just like you'd

apply Daubert here if the state had jurisdiction.

1

3

4

5

6

7

11

14

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

10:31:57AM 2

10:32:14AM 8

10:32:16AM 9

10:32:18AM10

10:32:22AM12

10:32:23AM13

10:32:29AM15

10:32:29AM16

So before you get all these things, you should, like all of these other cases do, say, wait a minute, you could file —
I recognize there may be in St. Louis or in California, if you did it, you could do it, but we're not in St. Louis or California, we are trying to determine if there's Federal Court jurisdiction here.

So you have to look, I believe --

THE COURT: Under CAFA. Under CAFA.

MR. CHEFFO: Well, under CAFA, now we're actually on -- probably under fraudulent joinder and misjoinder.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay.

MR. CHEFFO: Okay? So CAFA is easy for California, you decide it, and if you keep it, we're all --

THE COURT: I'm with you.

MR. CHEFFO: But in terms of severance, this has very significant implication, because if you first sever, there's frankly hundreds of cases where just by the virtue of severance, you don't even have to reach fraudulent joinder. There's cases, for example, where you have a Wisconsin person in one of those, you know, 97-person California claims -- and there's complete diversity, right -- the only issue there, and, in fact, some of those, they've waived the forum defendant rule. So let's say there's two, 300 cases where, if you had basically -- if you sever and you broke them up and

10:33:57AM15

10:34:16AM19

10:34:20AM21

10:33:24AM 6

look at them individually, say okay, Mrs. Smith versus Pfizer here and McKesson. Some of them would automatically be in this court. Not all of them, in fact, the majority would not. The majority then, once you sever it, then you would have to go through and do a fraudulent joinder analysis.

So whether you want to call this severance under Rule 21, or you want to call it procedural misjoinder, those are important issues. Then I think what you would look at, and I understand Your Honor's -- your point on some of the fraudulent joinder issues. But McKesson is a unique animal. This is not like, you know, a local defendant who actually you're suing a big company and someone actually did something. There's three cross-cutting arguments as to McKesson, that I think are incredibly powerful, particularly here.

The first is preemption, right? And, you know, very simply, in Mensing and Bartlett, if you can't change the label and you can't redesign it, how can you respect McKesson, all they are is the distributor of the medicine.

THE COURT: Of course, they allege marketing, sales, representations.

MR. CHEFFO: No, and we'll talk about that, I'll go back to the podium in a second, but there is essentially failure on the pleadings. So basically what they say is they say McKesson distributes one-third of all medicines in America, and on information and belief, you know, all the

1.3

10:35:58AM22

10:34:39AM 3

10:35:12AM 9

10:35:19AM11

people in this complaint did it. So that doesn't meet any standard.

And then there's actually this intent issue. And I will give you, as to people, some of the plaintiffs will talk about, that's a harder argument for us, but as to a number of them, it's a pretty easy argument. Because the Lopez firm, for example, filed motions to remand. So let me just take them one at a time.

THE COURT: I mean, you acknowledge that the sort of egregious circumstances of Avantia are not here.

MR. CHEFFO: I do and I don't. Okay? So, for example, and I don't in any way mean to pick on Mr. Lopez, but these cases -- So what happened -- you probably remember this -- very back in 2014 -- so, you know, Mr. Lopez is one of the executive committee members, as Your Honor knows, and he had some cases, right? And he said, I am going to keep all these cases here, right? And he -- not only is he an executive committee member, he had three discovery pool cases, was intimately involved in discovery, they have not served a single document request. I haven't even heard McKesson in any of these depositions use -- they've never attended.

So then -- and basically this is what they did, remember we were talking about all kind of minutia about adverse events, and they pursued all that; they did not pursue anything versus McKesson.

10:36:08AM 1

2

3

10:36:23AM 5

7

6

10:36:34AM 8

9

10

11

10:36:43AM12

10:36:44AM13

10:36:45AM14

16 17

15

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

10:37:24AM25

So when you talk about intent -- and these were discovery pool cases. So I would argue two things on that, Your Honor. The first is, at least as to all of the cases that are in -- and this is -- these remand motions --

THE COURT: But if McKesson was a party in some of the pool cases, we would not have tried McKesson, would we have? I mean, my MDL is --

MR. CHEFFO: No, but here's why, right, and this goes to the intent point. They only filed motions to remand hundreds of cases, after your Daubert ruling came out. So they basically -- this is Avantia --

THE COURT: Let my say this.

MR. CHEFFO: -- on steroids.

THE COURT: We all know that everybody games jurisdiction. No one is free of that. My friend, Andre Davis, a Fourth Circuit case which he dissents from an en banc case, and he, in a great dissent, he said, listen, everybody games jurisdiction. Start looking at people's ethics, because everybody does it, and there's nothing wrong with it, it's just the defendants want to be in Federal Court, the plaintiffs want to be in State Court, that's just the way it is. And they all use the rules, and it's just -- the court's trying to be neutral in these things and apply the rules.

MR. CHEFFO: Your Honor, this is not about ethics.

10:37:25AM 1

THE COURT: So when you say -- I mean, I stayed all the remand cases, so they didn't do any discovery in those cases. They moved to stay, you consented to it, so I mean, they weren't going to do discovery in those cases. And I wasn't going to try McKesson cases if they were in my pool, right?

10:37:44AM 7

MR. CHEFFO: Right. Well, that's why I said there are two issues. Right? And I'm not -- just to be clear, I'm not in any way challenging ethics, I think this was the right choice. Basically what happened -- and let me put aside the non -- let me only talk about Mr. Lopez' cases and then we'll talk about the state California cases.

10:38:00AM13

These are cases that are in your court that are not stayed. Okay? He filed in the —— for hundreds of them. He filed motions to remand, after Your Honor ruled on Daubert. Based on the cases that are already here. So that's what I'm talking about right now, right? So those, when you want to look at did he have an intent, this is not ethics; he was right, he said, look, I don't really need McKesson in these cases, I want to stay in Federal Court, they don't add any value, and I'm not going to really pursue them. And that's what he did all through the litigation, and then after the Daubert rulings come down, he says, oh, by the way we have a subject matter jurisdiction here and there's no diversity. So that's one.

10:38:35AM 1

2

3

4

10:38:48AM 5

10:38:48AM 6

10:38:49AM 7

10:38:50AM 8

9

10

11

12

10:39:04AM13

10:39:04AM14

15

16

17

10:39:18AM18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: But you want me to reach down and point out in these thousands of cases, one lawyer, and focus on his intent. You know, there are practical limitations on an MDL management of reaching down like this.

MR. CHEFFO: I agree.

THE COURT: I mean --

MR. CHEFFO: I agree.

THE COURT: And you know, this is not like a single case which we could -- we wouldn't have the time -- I mean, one of my great disappointments in this MDL is we never found a case to try. And, you know, I -- you know, I went to great lengths --

MR. CHEFFO: You did.

THE COURT: -- to try to get one tried. And lo and behold, after we did all that, that the new theory is they don't need an expert, right? I mean, I would have loved one of them to step forward and we'd have tried the case.

But, you know, I can't be -- it's just not practical to be reaching down and trying to get the measure of the intent of a lawyer, of a lawyer, when most of his cases were stayed, the remand cases, he later did this, listen, I get it, I saw what he did, I mean, you know, wasn't any secret to me, I saw. He was -- everybody's gaming the system, just like somebody would say, well, what is Pfizer reaching in California and transferring these cases to the MDL? I don't fault you for

2

3

6

7

10

11

12

13

14

16

17

18

19

20

22

24

25

10:40:06AM 5

10:40:15AM 8

10:40:42AM15

10:40:58AM21

10:41:03AM23

it. That's a reasonable effort, whether you succeed or not, it's done in good faith, I don't question your good faith. It might have been pushing the limits of the law, but what's wrong with that? That's what good lawyers do.

So I think what's good for the goose here is good for the gander. I'm not big on trying to examine the bad faith of lawyers.

MR. CHEFFO: Let's me say this. There's no question, as to all of the others, I think we raised the argument, that's not our strongest argument. When you look at the issues here, once you — if you do sever, or frankly, even if you don't, when you look at the fraudulent joinder, I think the preemption argument as to McKesson is the strongest, and I think also this issue of intent, failure to state a claim.

So plaintiff's complaint must allege causation. McKesson was in some way responsible for the pills that caused plaintiffs' alleged injury. The fact the pleadings are liberally construed does not dispense with this requirement. And Your Honor, I'm sure, has and will go back, but I went back and looked at the complaints —

THE COURT: I went back, I have them in my notebook.

I didn't read obviously every one, but I did read several.

MR. CHEFFO: Sure. And we understand liberal pleading, but I think this is a very strong and very fair argument that when you're basically trying to look at

putting -- if you get past preemption, then you have the pleading issues in terms of fraudulent joinder.

1

2

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

17

18

19

20

22

23

24

25

10:42:02AM16

10:42:23AM21

10:41:17AM 3

10:41:22AM 5

10:41:31AM 7

I think there's two other quick arguments that we have that are actually a little more specific.

So here's kind of the wrinkle. Upon, you know, upon information and belief, then you have maybe one --

it. But here's my point on that. I can understand it's a strategy call in complex litigation you have to make. Am I going stay here and fight for jurisdiction here, or am I going to go back to the State Court and move for summary judgment in those states that have — obviously there's no liability to the distributor. You make the call to do that. I don't question it. There's not a right or wrong answer to this, there's a strategic calls you make.

But having me get into the weeds on these individual cases doesn't make a lot of sense to me. What we do here is we send them back and we try it. You know, we have these like really sound practices, and you can't always follow them all in an MDL, but you try to use sound practices.

When we have a removal and there's this -- there's fraudulent joinder issues, we remand it, and some defendants aggressively jump on it and whack them good, there's no claim, and -- you know, before I even know they're gone, they're back.

10:42:41AM 1

2

3

4

5

6

8

10

11

12

1.3

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. CHEFFO: Judge, here's the difference, I think, in this, right, just so we're clear what's been going on. I would understand if we were kind of selectively around the country saying, okay, we're not going to remove cases from Wisconsin because there's some tactical advantage, right? We have removed and tagged every case --

10:42:58AM 7

THE COURT: But that doesn't make it right. If you don't have jurisdiction, you don't have jurisdiction.

10:43:03AM 9

MR. CHEFFO: No, I understand that, but you were saying why don't you just kind fight these battles out. And I think the difference is in the one off cases is that's the whole point of the MDL. Our position when, you know, when the first MDL was -- once the Court established it, was we want to have all of these issues. You know, we didn't remove after Your Honor's Daubert ruling or after this or that, we basically said we think these cases have jurisdiction, you should not be able to file, you know, 3000 plus cases in California, of which four or -- 400 something of them are California residents, right, lump them together, they have nothing to do, they maybe could find California on a map, probably most people have never been to California or done anything, and we basically said, we're entitled to this thing called federal jurisdiction, there's an MDL. So our efforts from the very beginning were to move. In fact, we asked for jurisdictional discovery. So we --

10:43:51AM 1

2

10:43:55AM 3

10:43:56AM 4

5 6

> 8 9

7

10

11 12

10:44:26AM13

14 15

16

17

18

19

10:44:58AM20

10:44:59AM21

23

22

24 25

THE COURT: And I wasn't going to get into the weeds on these individual cases.

MR. CHEFFO: Right.

THE COURT: You see, if I put my hat on as the MDL judge and say I want -- you know, my preference would be to have every case here, have it in one place, and then all these different courts wouldn't have to tackle, and all these parties wouldn't have to run around the country litigating these issues. I get that. But that's not what Congress provided with CAFA. I mean, that's not what Congress did. And I can't rewrite the deal that Congress -- the compromise Congress wrote about that.

And similarly, this issue about the, you know, defense, this is not a secret that many defendants have loudly complained with the manipulation of jurisdiction. And one of the solutions could be to do something about fraudulent joinder, not to -- reverse somehow in the rules, establish a statutory basis that's higher than, you know, glimmer of hope. Okay? Congress could do that, they could --

MR. CHEFFO: But severance does that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, I'm not -- I frankly think that these -- if I took down an individual case, these parties would have -- I wouldn't sever them, I just wouldn't do it. And it's not something we normally do. And I think it's creative, it's interesting. It's not practical. It's not

practical how we apply the rules, and I don't think we ought to be trying to defeat what seems to be the policy in CAFA, your jurisdiction under CAFA is very limited, and you're trying to, through different devices, to turn it into general jurisdiction.

And if I were in Congress, I might have voted that way, but that's not my hat I'm wearing here.

MR. CHEFFO: So, Your Honor, I only want to be up here as long as it's helpful.

THE COURT: By the way, I'm giving the other side as long a time as you get.

MR. CHEFFO: They may not need it, depending on how Your Honor comes out.

So is it Your Honor's view, and again, just so I know kind of what may be helpful and may not be helpful, is your view that this CAFA decision is not something that you believe you should be ruling on, and --

THE COURT: Yeah, I think that there's -- it seems to me that the issue of whether this is a mass action is largely settled by the Ninth Circuit decision. So I don't think that's the question. There is a timeliness question that needs -- about whether removal was timely, but I feel like the right decision on my part is to send to my colleagues in California whether that initial removal was proper, allow them to rule on that issue and litigate that issue. And then if it

10:45:32AM 6

10:45:38AM 8

9

1

2

3

4

5

7

10:45:42AM10

11

10:45:46AM12

13

10:45:51AM14

15

16

17

10:46:05AM18

19

21

20

22

23

24

wasn't timely, and/or otherwise they determined there's not CAFA jurisdiction, they could send it back to State Court. they determine no, it was timely and there is CAFA jurisdiction, then they can consolidate them within each of the districts where these cases are pending, and can have their sort of mini MDL within those individual districts.

Listen, I wouldn't design that as a system, but that's what Congress, as I read the CAFA statute, to provide for that. That was the deal. And there were benefits to that, because if you didn't have that, you couldn't even argue you had federal jurisdiction without complete diversity, but it came with strings. And I can't shed those strings.

I've got to say, I started considering all this remand issue, saying, gee, wouldn't it be nice to keep everybody here, I'll be honest with you, that's sort of the MDL judge, that's sort of your idea is you want all the cases here. But that's not what the law is. I have to apply the law.

And as I read each of the MDL -- each of the remand orders that my Magistrate Judge did, Judge Marchant, I began to -- every time they came in, I read them, I would look at the underlying cases, and then eventually in preparation of this argument I looked at everything again. And I went back and read the legislative history of CAFA. And I know it's not a result that you particularly endorse, but I think it's the proper application of the law. I really do.

10:47:04AM 7

10:47:29AM13

10:47:50AM18

10:48:21AM 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

10:48:57AM 8

10

10:49:06AM11

12

14

1.3

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

10:49:48AM25

Now, you might go back to the JPML and urge them, you know, to send it back to me, I mean, I can't remand. Okay? don't have the authority. I could make a suggestion, and my colleagues at the JPML will make a decision about what to do. And if they send it back in the District of California, you can contest this issue about whether you have even CAFA jurisdiction.

You know, it's not a perfect solution, but that's -- we have this rule of law in America, you know, we follow the rules, and those are the rules, as I read them.

MR. CHEFFO: Okay, Your Honor. And I understand that. And just so then the only other issue, right, is all of this other severance, fraudulent joinder, is that something that -- because we do have a report and recommendation, we have the ruling here, is that something -- because we do have some other arguments that if your point is they're better positioned on timeliness. So, for example, right, when the cases first came in, we said, look, you know, we don't want a lot of discovery, but we know most of these people are not going to have proof of it, so why don't you give us some limited jurisdiction. And what Your Honor said was -- you didn't say no, you said, I'm going defer on that, because if there ever comes a time where that is relevant, which is a reasonable position --

THE COURT: Let me just say my thoughts about that,

because this issue was raised, is the idea that we were going to go find -- How many California cases are there?

MR. CHEFFO: Cases or plaintiffs?

1

2

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

10:49:58AM 3

10:50:00AM 4

10:50:01AM 5

10:50:02AM 6

THE COURT: I mean how many plaintiffs.

MR. CHEFFO: Three thousand plus.

THE COURT: Okay. We were going to take thousands of people who had tens of thousands, maybe hundreds of thousands of prescriptions, and we were going to somehow dig into where every one of those prescriptions came from. Now, in a perfect world one person would go to the same pharmacy. You're now the world's expert that that's not what happens, right? They go to all kinds of pharmacies. And it was going to be a, you know, huge confusing -- I mean, this was not like anything you could briefly do. I know y'all said, oh, we can tell McKesson and who these pharmacies are. Just the process of figuring all that, that just seemed to me a complete diversion. of them were going to stay, there was no question McKesson was a substantial number, we didn't know what percentage, but some substantial number was going to stay. That's just not the way we do these issues. We don't do all of the discovery here, when there's -- we send it back to the remand court to do that. And you will have the opportunity at some point to raise that issue. And I understand your client's view is that we fight here for federal jurisdiction, we don't go back and fight in every state. I get that strategy. But that strategy

comes with some pluses and some negatives. And one of the negatives is you don't get to go back there and whack these cases out of the -- you know, removing those defendants that -- in which there is no legal basis for them.

Listen. You know, we could have a conference on this issue in which parties could discuss — we could have a thing, what are the areas of the law which, you know, over the years involved adoptions that if we ever were starting over, we wouldn't adopt, this might be near the top of the list. But that's the law.

MR. CHEFFO: Your Honor, I have been before the Court enough to know that you give everything a full and fair opportunity. We may not agree on this issue, but I hear what you're saying.

The last thing I will just say is I would -- the law doesn't change in an MDL per se, but there are different considerations.

THE COURT: There are different, I agree with that.

MR. CHEFFO: That's what I think all of these other courts, there's about 15 or 20 of them, Benicar, Fosamax, because what every court says is I do not have to basically be the victim of someone's creative lawyer's word processor. And I'm able to basically set the table and look at this under the Federal Rules and find out what's really going on here.

And I think if you do that, I don't want to be

10:51:30AM 5

6 7

1

2

3

8

9

10

10:51:55AM11

12

13

14

10:52:03AM15

16 17

10:52:13AM18

10:52:14AM19

20

21

22

23

24

10:52:34AM25

presumptuous, but we all know exactly what's going on here, is that people are trying to basically -- See, we're looking at it from Pfizer trying to get jurisdiction, but this is frankly, as I see it, an affirmative effort to deny Pfizer the jurisdiction that it deserves under both diversity and under CAFA. And that is an affirmative effort.

THE COURT: That's an argument that is a hundred years in the making. This approach of naming parties is done every day in the courts of America. You're laying out an argument that defendants complain about every day. But that's the law.

MR. CHEFFO: Well --

THE COURT: And you may not like it, and you might want me to find some work around to avoid what I believe is the law of the country. And I'm just not going to -- you know, I understand if I was sitting at one of these seminars and you were talking about how we might change the rule, we might talk about it. But I don't have that freedom, and I don't believe I should manipulate the rules.

You know, you talk about your client's interests; there's also issues of state comity between State Courts and Federal Courts. These aren't single factors here in which there's only -- all good is on one side and all the other -- there are arguments, some would say you overreached pulling these cases, California has this system, they consolidate cases and you

10:52:57AM 7

10:53:17AM12

10:53:18AM13

10:53:41AM20

1

2

3

4

5

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

10:54:30AM 6

10:54:39AM 9

snatched it out. I don't fault you for it, I think it was, you know, why not try it. But in the end we all have to work out these things, and the only way I know how to do it is to neutrally apply the rules in a way that I think is reasonable, and then whatever happens, happens.

MR. CHEFFO: So are you going to rule, Your Honor, on the -- all these fraudulent joinder issues, or is that something that you're going to allow the District Courts in --

THE COURT: I'm going to have the district courts do I really think there's enough -- you know, I've looked at these several -- this is like, you know, something that's so -- as much baked into what we do every day as different judges, we see these things. And you're not from here, but there are certain counties here, I could tell Mr. Cole could look at it, we could name the counties where everybody -- all these plaintiffs' lawyers are trying to, every time somebody stubs a toe in the county, they're bringing major lawsuits. And there are all these devices to avoid federal jurisdiction. And it takes a fairly unskilled plaintiff's lawyer not to get it back. I mean, I'm just saying to you, the ones who know what they're doing, it's not heavy lifting. Now, should that be the law? I mean, that's my circuit's law, it's the country's law, and -- but, you know, you're preaching to the choir a little bit here, but I think under the limits of what I can do about it.

10:55:44AM 1 10:55:45AM 2 10:55:46AM 3 10:55:54AM 5 10:55:54AM 6 10:55:56AM 7 10:55:57AM 8 10:55:59AM 9 10 10:56:01AM11 12 10:56:07AM13 14 15 16 10:56:15AM17 18 19 20 10:56:30AM21 22

23

24

25

MR. CHEFFO: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Okay. How about my California counsel; who's going to argue that?

MR. CHEFFO: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. KAUFMAN: I don't know if I'm that plaintiff.

THE COURT: What is your name?

MR. KAUFMAN: My name is Justin Kaufman.

THE COURT: Yes, sir, Mr. Kaufman. Where are you from?

MR. KAUFMAN: I am from New Mexico, but I am here on behalf of the California, Missouri --

THE COURT: Mr. Cheffo would say that's part of the conspiracy that -- even the lawyers have no California connection. Have you ever been to -- By the way, have you ever been to California?

MR. KAUFMAN: I have been, Your Honor. There is a good reason for that. We're here out of the Lipitor JCPP. My law partner, Bill Robbins, who is on the executive committee, had a conflict, I drew the short straw, so here I am.

And based on your conversation with Mr. Cheffo, you know, our position, as you've read, is very clear. We think the Magistrate Judge was correct in his orders, we think he eventually came around to the right decision with respect to the JPML. And unless you have any other questions for us, we

agree with everything you've said so far this morning.

10:56:50AM 2

10:56:59AM 5

3

4

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

16

17

20

24

10:57:44AM15

10:57:52AM18

10:57:53AM19

10:57:56AM21

10:57:58AM22

10:57:59AM23

10:58:02AM25

THE COURT: Well, many lawyers will get up after I questioned the other lawyer and try to buy it back, they want to give me other arguments.

Yeah, it just seems to me, Mr. Kaufman, that y'all adequately pled it to — the claims to survive a claim on fraudulent joinder. That I have no doubt if the Court digs into these that many of the claims might go away, would go away. But I'm not able, I don't think it's proper for me to do that, that's for the traditional practices for the remand court to do it. And I don't ascribe any bad motives to anybody, it's just the gamesmanship of jurisdiction that both parties practice. But if you don't have anything further, we'll move on to another state.

MR. KAUFMAN: That's it, Your Honor. We've actually touched on. Obviously I'm here for Missouri and Illinois as well, so I'll have the same thing to say.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KAUFMAN: But we've touched on really all the issues from those states as well.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

MR. KAUFMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Cheffo, do you want to proceed to Missouri?

MR. CHEFFO: Yes, Your Honor.

10:58:03AM 1

THE COURT: Yeah.

10:58:14AM 2

MR. CHEFFO: I think this filing was helpful that we had, because a lot of what we've been talking about, I think are, you know, arguments that we've made here. There are some

5

3

4

THE COURT: There are some Missouri twists.

MR. CHEFFO: Yeah, there are. So there are three

10:58:29AM 6 10:58:26AM 7

cases, right, each has one Missouri and one or more

encourage you to look at these through severance and

9

8

plaintiffs. I won't make the argument again, other than to

10

11

misjoinder, because I think that, frankly, when you set the

12

table like that it really makes many of these cases diverse

13

and you don't need to go, because there's not a fraudulent

14

joinder issue here. These are just basically putting a bunch

of folks together with one nondiverse plaintiff, and were you

THE COURT: Missouri law, I mean, I know Judge Perry

1516

to --

differences.

10:58:54AM17

very well, who is a St. Louis judge who ruled most recently

19

18

in -- she's like a really serious judge, I know her very well

20

from the MDL conferences and so forth, and she -- I don't remember which of the cases, but in one of them she, you know,

2122

basically said the Eighth Circuit in Nolton said you can bring

23

these, you know, that an out-of-state defendant which has

24

registered to do business and designated an agent for service,

25

has consented to service -- I mean, that's one view of the

law. There are other colleagues there who have a different view. And I've got to look at it and say is there like no possibility that they would — that that's — is there no possibility? No, there is a possibility. I mean, the split in the law basically answers the question. And so —

MR. CHEFFO: I guess -- I am sorry.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. CHEFFO: Two things. One is, which I will get to the personal jurisdiction argument I think you're referencing, but the rules of severance would be governed by this circuit, and I think you looked at them, basically just Rule 21, and then you then look at them kind of differently.

THE COURT: But it's the same -- my Magistrate Judge,
I thought, made a lot of sense on this. Same drug, same
research. I mean, yeah, you know, that there are some
differences, but we wouldn't, in a normal case, sever this
case. We wouldn't sever it and try separately. No, we'd
never do that. We'd try them together. So just practically
speaking, I'm telling you we would.

MR. CHEFFO: If people filed, I mean, a-hundred-person complaint here --

THE COURT: Well, I wouldn't do that, but Missouri apparently does that.

MR. CHEFFO: But if you -- again, I would just argue, Your Honor, that for severance issues, we're not talking

10:59:56AM 6

11:00:00AM 7

11:00:00AM 8

9

1

2

3

4

5

10

11

12

11:00:16AM13

14

15

16

17

18

19

11:00:41AM20

21

11:00:44AM22

23

11:00:48AM24

25

substantive law here. It's the what would happen if. If someone came in --

THE COURT: It's just a device. I mean, these cases came to us from Missouri. Arguably, that procedure is allowed in Missouri. And I'm supposed to come in and carve out the New York person, I mean, it's just a more intense involvement than we would normally do in these cases. And I'm just not persuaded that's the role for us to do.

And there was a method -- you've elected not to do it -to go back and get the Missouri courts to rule on that. God
knows somebody needs to get them to rule on it, right? And
you elected not do that. And then if you were right on that,
there's just -- that the New York plaintiff was improperly in
the case, you know, you would have had complete diversity and
you'd have -- I just -- you know, you're asking me to now use
the Rule 21 as sort of this device that is a work around, and
I just think that's a proper -- we wouldn't normally do that.

MR. CHEFFO: I don't want to be presumptuous -THE COURT: Go right ahead.

MR. CHEFFO: No, no, just a practicality, because you don't, you know, I mean, I don't think this district wants to become a place where people come and start filing, you know, thousands cases from all over the country. So I would actually just -- I think --

THE COURT: Usually the JPML has some role, and I

12

11:01:22AM 9

1

2

5

6

7

8

10

11

13

14

15

16

11:00:57AM 3

17

11:02:11AM18 11:02:13AM19

11:02:15AM20

21

22

23

24

11:02:28AM25

have kind of consent over whether we're going to --

11:03:09AM15

11:02:33AM 2

MR. CHEFFO: But let's assume now they decide, okay, well, we can go down to South Carolina and we can file one complaint, you know, 80 people. Lipitor is all over the world, all over the country, right, and pay one filing fee. I actually disagree. I think that, one, your clerk would do it, and I think if you had seven or eight of those cases and you had 800 cases and you would say, wait a minute, you're putting these all in the same complaint, you're not telling me anything about these cases, you would say wait a minute, you have to break these up. These are individual cases. Like you did in your case management order here, you have to file single party, you have to do a fact sheet, you have to look at them individually.

So no one is suggesting that you couldn't have mechanisms to combine them. But in terms of whether these — the standard, do they all arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. You know certainly as well as I do the differences in these cases. And that's the issue here. This is not a work around. This is what would happen if you had people who said, you know, I drank Coke—a—Cola and I think there's a problem, and I'm coming from Wisconsin and I drank it eight years ago, and then I'm coming from New Mexico and I drank it yesterday, and this person drank it for one day and I drank it for ten years, I think any court, and most courts

and --

1

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

25

11:04:51AM24

11:03:43AM 2

11:03:45AM 3

11:04:01AM 9

11:04:20AM13

11:04:15AM14

THE COURT: You're talking about a direct file.

MR. CHEFFO: Well, right, and essentially that's what's before the Court. You'd say if that was the case, if that was filed today, this case direct file, what you would do, and I think any court in this circuit would do, is to say wait a minute, do these satisfy the Rule 21 standards? Is this appropriate?

THE COURT: But you're talking about a direct file case versus a case which is arguably, you know, properly filed in Missouri, pulled out of Missouri, where there is not complete diversity, brought here --

MR. CHEFFO: Right.

THE COURT: -- on the basis there is complete diversity, and you're asking me now to drill down into the cases, which would be proper in Missouri, arguably proper in Missouri. The normal way we would deal with that is I'd send it back to the Missouri court, and if it's not proper, that would be addressed within the year, and they could come back. That's the way we do it. And to ask me now, using the device of severance to separate something that under Missouri law is proper, it just -- You talk about being on steroids; you'd be turning removal on steroids.

MR. CHEFFO: But, Your Honor, there is a difference here. And the real difference is this is not a single-person

case where you send it back and you come back. This is a situation where people are putting hundreds of cases that on their face, right, I mean there's three complaint --

THE COURT: You say on their face? Apparently Missouri courts don't feel that way. At least some Missouri courts don't feel that way.

MR. CHEFFO: What we're asking you to do, Your Honor, is determine if this court has Federal Court jurisdiction. How the procedural findings, you may issue a Daubert ruling, and the Court may says that's Daubert, I have Frye or Kemp, so there may be differences, and that's even more substantive. believe this court and every court in the Federal Courts has to look at -- I mean -- there are times when you look, and I'll talk about with jurisdiction, whether you look at what the underlying law is. But frankly, this is a relatively -- I don't want to lean on the Court, but it's a mechanical federal look, under the law of this circuit. It doesn't matter what, you know, what happened before and how they put their word processor. Once we get in court we say, Judge Gergel, we'd like you to look at this and put your -- the real world glasses on, and if someone did file this same case for the first time here, I believe that every court would sever it. And if that's the answer, then that's the way for something as --

THE COURT: But removal cases, the practice is to

11:05:10AM 7

11:05:04AM 4

9

12

1.3

14

10

11

1

2

3

5

6

15 16

17 18

19

20

2122

23

24

11:06:02AM25

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

20

21

22

23

24

25

11:07:10AM17

11:07:11AM18

11:07:12AM19

send it back to the State Court to address that issue. elected, for your own reasons, I understand them, not to do that. There is a procedure; you elected not to use it, Mr. Cheffo, that's the problem. Is you could go back to -- Let's look at the practical thing. They moved to remand. You say, listen, I think I got the right position, this is not proper under Missouri law. I go back to Missouri, I immediately move, explain to the court we're trying to do this within the year, we want to do expedited discovery and get this issue, and then we want a definitive determination. There is a method; you elected not to pursue that. And now you're asking me to drill down into these cases, which arguably under the fraudulent joinder standard are properly before me, and you want me to drill down and start applying Rule 21 severance to those cases. That's just not -- that is a role in the process on removal and remand we don't do.

MR. CHEFFO: Judge --

THE COURT: That's just not what we do.

MR. CHEFFO: Look, I'm going to -- I hear you, and I am just going to make one other point, just because the fact that there may be procedural rules in a particular state that allow people to file multi-party complaints, okay, that really has -- someone should not be able to take something as important as diversity -- now, you're saying maybe if we go back, they allow it, and I would probably agree with you, and

1

2

3

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

18

21

23

24

25

11:08:40AM17

11:08:48AM19

11:08:49AM20

11:08:54AM22

11:07:49AM 5

if we do go back, we'll make those motions, may or may not win, depending whether somebody can file the complaint. But assuming they can, that doesn't change the court's look here, again, that's just the fact that someone --

THE COURT: But the plaintiff started their case in Missouri. They filed it in Missouri. We give some deference, and we say under very limited circumstances, very limited, we let the defendant remove the case, not just because we don't like the venue in St. Louis or -- We have certain rights under federal law to remove. Very limited rights. And now we're, you know, we're really, under fraudulent joinder status, we couldn't really remove it, but now we want the Court to come and put a surgical knife, go in and cut out all those people, sever them into another case, and then say, voila, we now have complete diversity. I'm not going to do that. In all due respect to you, I'm not going to do that.

And I think that's a manipulation of jurisdiction that I wouldn't feel comfortable doing.

MR. CHEFFO: Okay, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Different from it was a direct file to me. Different status of direct file versus --

MR. CHEFFO: Respectfully, I think they're the same, but I'm going to move on because you told me where you are on this. And, you know, we'll talk about the jurisdiction, and you may be in the same place. But basically our argument on

jurisdiction is really twofold. Right?

1

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1.3

14

15

16

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

11:09:33AM11

11:09:33AM12

11:09:47AM17

11:09:48AM18

11:09:08AM 2

And just to be clear, this is -- I am not arguing now for the kind of jurisdictional type discovery and documents, I mean, so this one is -- you know, you don't even need to do anything, right, we're talking about if you sever or even look at them separately, all you have to say, is this guy from New York or Delaware, they're not, Michigan, you know, so this is not -- you don't need to know anything more than where their complaint is, and you can make your determination. So it's a relatively easy one.

THE COURT: I understand that.

MR. CHEFFO: But so for -- you know, and this goes to, you know, the Supreme Court cases and Daimler, and really our argument is straightforward. And they're flip side. First is they're fraudulently joined because there's no personal jurisdiction.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. CHEFFO: Right? And you've talked about, you know, some of the issues there. But the other side, frankly, is under the Ruhrgas decision, Supreme Court decision, I think it's 1999, Your Honor can address the personal jurisdiction separately. Because we did file motions there, and there is some, you know, some precedent in this case that actually might work well, because it's — rather than sending all these cases back, you could address it. That's essentially our —

11:10:14AM 1

2

3

5

6

7

THE COURT: But obviously the Supreme Court case, the Ruhrgas case, talks about the general preference when we do subject matter, there are circumstances where it would be judicial economy to do personal first. Couple of my colleagues in MDLs had very definitive answers where they thought the subject matter jurisdiction was complicated, personal jurisdiction was simple.

Personal jurisdiction here is like really complicated in Missouri. It doesn't really accomplish — first of all, I have to rule on the subject matter elsewhere, so I'm not avoiding subject matter, I've got to rule on. And the personal here is, I mean, I've read every one of those cases I could find. I went and Shepardized the — I went and looked up cases that they cite. I mean, I was amazed what the division, and it seems to me on such a major issue, how there could be no State Court. And then I found like State Court trial court says, please, Missouri Supreme Court, reach a decision, you know.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ CHEFFO: There is an appeal of one of them, there's an --

THE COURT: Thank goodness. It's ridiculous. But you're asking me to get in there and try to figure out something that has confounded the Missouri judges? No. That's exactly one I would stay on subject matter, which I think is fairly clear, versus what is very unclear.

11:10:39AM 8

12

10

11

1415

1.3

16

17 18

11:11:17AM19

20

11:11:20AM21

23

24

22

25

So it's my call under Ruhrgas, and I looked at that hard.

2 And I mean, listen, let's face it, Mr. Cheffo, that Missouri 3 thing is a little unusual, right? I mean, allowing these 4 folks to come in and -- it's an unusual thing. But apparently 5 6 7

8

9

10

11

12

13

sparingly.

11:11:35AM 1

it's sort of allowed in Missouri. And part of our Federal Court State Court system is that we have some respect for the State Court processes, that we respect that. That we aren't sort of like the super court, that everybody just has to follow our tune. We try to respect State Court processes. And sometimes it's easier than others. Sometimes we just feel like the federal interests are so great we just have to do that. I mean, look, I grant habeases, right? But we do it

11:12:24AM14

11:12:28AM15

16

11:12:32AM17

18

19

11:12:39AM20

21

11:12:47AM22

23

25

24

MR. CHEFFO: Is that an option here?

THE COURT: You don't want to be a criminal defendant in my court.

MR. CHEFFO: No, again, I do appreciate the opportunity to present this to the Court. I don't think on this one I have anything else, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you very much. Mr. Kaufman, you have Missouri?

MR. KAUFMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. Very briefly, we, again, agree with everything you said. The only additional point I wanted to make, you talked about how, you know, this is really a State Court issue, you have the ability to send it back to State Court, Pfizer knows well. So the two cases that -- the two later filed Missouri cases, Scotino and Allen, at the time that those were filed, there were actually two other cases that didn't make it here, that's Polk -- and the other case was called -- let me grab it here.

THE COURT: Wasn't there a case set for trial that got settled?

MR. KAUFMAN: No, this is different, Your Honor. Four complaints were filed at the same time.

THE COURT: Okay.

1

2

3

4

7

12

1.3

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

24

25

11:14:07AM23

11:13:24AM 6

11:13:28AM 8

11:13:30AM10

11:13:31AM11

11:13:38AM14

MR. KAUFMAN: And the Clark versus Pfizer case and the Polk versus Pfizer case, they were both remanded before they were transferred to the MDL.

Okay. And the same arguments were made there by Pfizer as were made here, and the Federal Judge in Missouri rejected all those arguments and sent it back to State Court. Now, Pfizer in the State Court in Clark argued personal jurisdiction, which they have a right to do in the State Court in Missouri. And the State Court in Missouri denied that as well. So they found that there was personal jurisdiction over the non-Missouri plaintiffs in that State Court case. Pfizer took it up on a writ, the writ was denied.

So there is a procedure in place, I think Your Honor's identified it; that's the procedure that we think is applicable.

11:14:12AM 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

10

11

12

THE COURT: Obviously, Mr. Kaufman, when we do this mass tort situation, it stresses — it creates complications from our ability to normally drill down in an individual case and focus. It's just a weakness inherent in this, and we have to design procedures. And if I've got 5000 cases up here, I just can't drill down on 5000 cases. We couldn't manage it in that way.

11:14:37AM 8

And so it's not a perfect system. If I had the time and the resources, but we'd need, you know, four times the law clerks, and I mean, it's the same reason my colleagues on the joint panel, they have like minimal staff. They don't have any ability. They have their arms full just transferring the cases to us. I mean, they are just — they're doing all they can do.

1.3

14

11:15:02AM15

16 17

18

19

2021

22

24

11:15:37AM25

So I have some, frankly, some personal sympathy for the defendant's inability to get a quick ruling. I wish I could do it. There's just not a practical way to do that. And the process is, as you described, you go back to the State Court, you address it in State Court, and frankly, I think the defendant didn't do it here because they didn't think — they thought they had more chance of winning here. I respect their strategic call, these are good lawyers, they make their call. And maybe the experience in Missouri validated that they didn't have very good options either way.

So I think the right decision is to send it back and allow

the State Court in Missouri to address these issues. 11:15:43AM 2 MR. KAUFMAN: We agree, Your Honor, and that's all I 3 need to say on that. 11:15:46AM 4 THE COURT: Very good. 11:15:47AM 5 Okay. The next is Illinois related cases. Anyone want to 6 speak with regard to Illinois? 11:15:58AM 7 MR. CHEFFO: I think I've said our -- It's the same 8 argument, Your Honor. 11:16:02AM 9 THE COURT: Very good. How about Michigan? 10 Anything, Mr. Cheffo? 11:16:07AM11 MR. CHEFFO: Yeah, I'll be very brief, because again, 12 I do think --11:16:12AM13 THE COURT: By the way, I'm not allowing attorneys' 14 fees. They asked for attorneys' fees. No. No. 11:16:20AM15 MR. CHEFFO: Thank you. 11:16:24AM16 THE COURT: I thought you might like that. You can 17 call your client and say the bad news is they sent you the 700 18 jurisdiction, but good news is I didn't get tagged for 19 attorney fees. 11:16:40AM20 MR. CHEFFO: I'm going to flip them actually. I have some good news for you today. 21 11:16:46AM22 So again, I just wanted to make sure that there's nothing 23 kind of specific. I think the issues here, if you don't get 24 to severance, you don't get to our arguments, Your Honor, so

you'd have to sever, and then --

25

THE COURT: Same thing with the pharmacy defendant. Same situation.

MR. CHEFFO: And it's a fraudulent joinder argument which I think we've talked about.

THE COURT: Yes.

11:17:00AM 1

11:17:03AM 3

11:17:08AM 5

11:17:13AM 6

11:17:22AM 9

11:17:29AM11

11:17:52AM18

2

4

7

8

10

12

13

14

15

16

17

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. ALTMAN: Your Honor, Keith Altman on behalf of the Michigan plaintiffs. I think everything has pretty much been said. If Your Honor has any questions I can address --

THE COURT: I don't. I think these issues largely overlap with these others. Thank you, sir.

MR. CHEFFO: Not to go back, but this is from
Missouri on one second. Again, I know you have lots of things
going on and — but you probably already worked on your order.
So one thing I would ask you to consider is the Eighth Circuit
is actually addressing that issue of personal jurisdiction. I
think it's pretty soon, it's been briefed fully, so, you know,
you may or may not want to —

THE COURT: I just think let the -- I mean, you can go back and try to -- having me drill down on these individual states, I just think that's just more than the MDL court ought to be doing. But I've got the law as it is now, I have to apply the law. On every issue, believe me, there's court cases coming in, and y'all have been very good about supplementing, I think we have like multiple surreplies. I don't know what you call the eighth surreply, but you know, I

fear for the future of trees in America, they're all killed in this case. But, of course, you can accuse me of contributing to that by allowing all that discovery, right?

MR. CHEFFO: We're not going to go there today, Your Honor. No. Okay. I just wanted to bring that to your attention.

THE COURT: Thank you.

1

2

3

5

6

10

11

12

13

14

15

17

19

22

23

24

25

11:19:25AM16

11:19:35AM18

11:19:39AM20

11:19:41AM21

11:18:34AM 4

11:18:41AM 7

11:18:42AM 8

Okay. We are working on an order. I did, frankly, come here with a certain sort of view of the legal and factual issues here. And I largely agree with my Magistrate Judge, certainly on the result. There might be a twist or two in terms of how I get there. But I am going to deny the appeals in all nine cases and remand those cases to the districts where they came, other than California. And I intend to have a suggestion of remand to the JPML as to the California cases.

Are there other matters to come before the Court now, Mr. Hahn? I'm stunned with your silence up to this point.

MR. HAHN: Your Honor, on behalf of the plaintiff steering committee we have no position on --

THE COURT: I thought that would be your view.

MR. HAHN: However, to the extent that any of the remanded cases either have used or will use in the future any of the discovery of the plaintiff steering committee, we would like the Court to protect us as far as the confidential assessment.

11:19:57AM 1

2

3

11:20:09AM 4

5

67

11:20:24AM 8

9

10 11

12

13

14

15

11:20:59AM16

18

17

19

21

20

22

23

24

11:21:36AM25

Remind me, what CMO is it? I thought we tried to address that in anticipation that that might happen.

MR. HAHN: There is an order out there. The

I thought we tried to address that issue.

MR. HAHN: There is an order out there. The plaintiffs that are being remanded back, I'm not sure that they've all signed the document recognizing. And that it may come back around, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Listen, I think the work the plaintiffs did, both sides did in discovery, is just remarkable. And I don't think it's proper for counsel to come in, and in their capacity as part of this case, take that work product and then go back and basically, without compensation, not contribution to all these lawyers participating in this, I think that's wrong. And if I need to address it, I will. I think y'all have done a yeoman's work in pulling together that.

So if you see that we need to address the issue, I need to bring all the parties here, I want to give everybody notice, so I can hear from all sides here. But obviously I am very aware of extraordinary efforts that the litigation team for the plaintiff undertook here. And the understanding was that they were to receive this information as part of a share or a cost, that there was a collective effort, and I would — unless you can show me law I don't have the authority to do that, I would intend to enforce that, Mr. Hahn.

MR. HAHN: Thank you, Your Honor.

11:21:37AM 1 THE COURT: Any other matters to come before the 2 Court? Very good. With that, the hearing is adjourned. 11:21:42AM 3 (Court adjourned at 11:30 a.m.) 11:21:42AM 4 11:21:45AM 5 11:21:45AM 6 11:21:45AM 7 11:21:45AM 8 11:21:45AM 9 11:21:45AM10 11:21:45AM11 11:21:45AM12 11:21:45AM13 11:21:45AM14 11:21:45AM15 11:21:45AM16 11:21:45AM17 11:21:45AM18 11:21:45AM19 11:21:45AM20 11:21:45AM21 11:21:45AM22 11:21:45AM23 11:21:45AM24 11:21:45AM25

11:21:46AM 1 11:21:46AM 2 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION 11:21:46AM 11:21:46AM 3 11:21:46AM 11:21:46AM 4 I, Debra L. Potocki, RMR, RDR, CRR, Official Court 11:21:46AM 11:21:46AM 5 Reporter for the United States District Court for the District 11:21:46AM 11:21:46AM 6 of South Carolina, hereby certify that the foregoing is a true 11:21:46AM 11:21:46AM 7 and correct transcript of the stenographically recorded above 11:21:46AM 11:21:46AM 8 proceedings. 11:21:46AM 11:21:46AM 9 11:21:46AM 11:21:46AM10 11:21:46AM 11:21:46AM11 11:21:46AM S/Debra L. Potocki 11:21:46AM12 11:21:46AM 11:21:46AM13 Debra L. Potocki, RMR, RDR, CRR 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25